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REMEDIES IN DOMAIN NAME
LAWSUITS: HOW IS A DOMAIN
NAME LIKE A COW?
by

CARL OPPEDAHLt

I. INTRODUCTION
In three short years the Internet domain name has gone from an
intellectual curiosity to one of the most hotly contested forms of intellec-

tual property. While thousands of domain names have been fought over,
only a handful of court opinions have been written. There is as yet no
well-developed body of law regarding remedies in domain name cases.
This article offers a framework for analysis and proposes an answer to a
central question:
Under what circumstances ought a court take away a domain name
from one party and give it to another?

II. BACKGROUND
The significance of an Internet domain name derives fundamentally
from the significance of the Internet itself. The Internet is the single
most pervasive and potent agent of change in modern society. It has unified the e-mail systems of most of the individuals, companies, and organizations in the world. Any two persons, connected to the Internet,
anywhere on the planet, may communicate via e-mail, regardless of the
types of computers and software they may use.1 The Internet has made
possible the World Wide Web ("Web"), an interlinked structure of computer networks which now makes a significant fraction of the body of
human knowledge available to anyone with an Internet connection and a
Web browser. The Web allows anyone to be an instant publisher, and
the publication is not only instant but worldwide. The World Wide Web
t Partner, Oppedahl & Larson; e-mail: oppedahl@patents.com. J.D. Harvard University 1981.
1. The Internet-style e-mail address, a user name and domain name conjoined with
an "@"sign, is now standard worldwide and all other forms of e-mail addresses have fallen
out of use.
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has enabled a variety of meta-applications such as Web search engines, 2
which permit searching the Web quickly and thoroughly. People sharing
any interest, no matter how obscure, can learn of each other's existence
and devote arbitrarily large amounts of time and energy to that interest,
whatever it may be.
From its origins, the Internet has been consensus-driven and uncontrolled by any governmental or central authority. As such, the Internet
differs from other agents of change, namely telephone, broadcast radio,
and broadcast television, which were taken completely under the control
of regulators and governments early in their development. Even the terminology of the Internet's organization shows its consensus-based nature: where other media are defined by "standards" 3 and
"specifications," the interaction of elements of the Internet is set forth in
Requests for Comment ("RFC").4 Any author may publish an RFC for
consideration by the Internet community. If a consensus develops
around a particular RFC then it may be adopted and followed by the
entirety of the Internet, at which point it enjoys the status that a "standard" or "specification" has in other industries. There are thousands of
RFCs, which define, for example, how computer systems exchange email, and how computer systems are to route data packets to each other.
Some commentators refer to the Internet as "anarchic," a term which is
meant to convey the absence of central planning and the insusceptibility
to governmental control. Of course, in an important sense, the Internet
is not anarchic at all. The Internet functions only because every computer connected to it behaves in precisely the manner set forth in myriad
RFCs, not deviating an iota from the prescribed behavior.
All interaction via the Web relies upon uniform resource locators
("URL"s), each of which is comprised of a protocol identifier, a domain
name defining a physical host, and optional location information within
the host.5 A typical URL is http://www.patents.com/nsi/iip.sht, which

uses the domain name patents.com, which would be useless if the patents.com domain name did not function. All e-mail interaction relies
2. E.g., Alta Vista, <http'//www.altavista.digital.com.html>; Lycos, <http://
www.lycos.com.html>; and Yahoo!, <http://www.yahoo.com.html>.
3. For example, in the United States, the National Technical Standards Committee
promulgates NTSC standards for broadcast television.
4. There are by now over a thousand RFCs, one of which is RFC 1591. J. Postel,
Domain Name System Structure and Delegation, RFC 1591 (March 1994) <ftp//
rs.internic.net/rfc/rfcl591.txt>. RFC 1591 sets forth, among other things, the role of a domain name registration authority with respect to disputes over Internet domain names.
Id.
5. The majority of URLs begin with "http'//" which stands for Hypertext Transport
Protocol. It is commonplace to omit the "http./" and most Web browsers will supply it if the
user does not enter it. A URL that begins with "httpi/ may be variously referred to as a
"Web address," "Web page address" or "Web site address."
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upon e-mail addresses, each of which likewise contains a domain name,
without which the e-mail address would not function.
In principle, a URL or e-mail address could be an arbitrary string of
characters, no easier to remember than a street address, a numeric telephone number, a geographic latitude or longitude, or the internal hardware ("MAC") address of one's Ethernet card. Indeed, some URLs and email addresses are largely or wholly arbitrary. 6 However, for many purposes, it is desirable that a URL or e-mail address be easily remembered.
Notably, many television advertisements end with a Web address which
a viewer might use to obtain more information about the goods or services touted in the advertisement. The Web address serves this purpose
well only if it is easily remembered, which necessarily requires that the
domain name, which forms part or all of the Web address, likewise be
easily remembered.
A series of rather unfortunate historical accidents has led many
large companies to perceive the domain name to be extremely important.
To these companies it is important not only that a domain name be easily
remembered, but also that it be easily guessed. For example, a company
named "Brown Enterprises" may wish to have the domain name
"brown.com," since that might be a first guess made by a would-be visitor
to the Web site of Brown Enterprises. This perception has led to bitter
legal disputes. An example is the recent case in which Juno Electric, a
maker of light fixtures, took steps to deprive Juno Online, an e-mail service provider, of the domain name juno.com. Had the steps initiated by
Juno Electric reached their conclusion, some seven hundred thousand email customers of Juno Online would have lost their ability to receive email. Juno Electric presumably wanted to possess the domain name so
that would-be visitors to its Web site could guess the address
www.juno.com, and thereby reach the Web site of Juno Electric rather
than of Juno Online.
Commentators have suggested that the present-day emphasis on domain names is inappropriate and that in coming years search engines
and other metalayers of Internet interaction will develop to make domain names unimportant, and thus, not worth fighting over. 7 The views
of such commentators cannot be ignored, considering generally the fast
pace of change within the Internet, and considering as a particular example the Web search engines which now play a crucial role in the Web
and which did not even exist three years ago. The fact remains, however,
that at the present time, domain names are hotly contested. The courts
6. For example, many CompuServe e-mail addresses begin with nine randomly assigned numerical digits.
7. Don Mitchell et al., In whose domain: name service in adolescence (visited Feb. 1,
1997) <http.//ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/bradner.html>.
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and the legal profession have no choice but to attempt to understand the
purpose and function of domain names, and to try to develop sensible
principles according to which domain name disputes will be decided and
resolved. In particular, a law of remedies for domain names must be
developed.
A.

CATEGORIZING DISPUTES

The domain name disputes that are publicly known have been listed
and summarized by several commentators. 8 Several distinctions may be
drawn among the disputes.
1. Uniqueness.
Some domain names are identical to unique commercial names. For
example, PANAVISION and ACTMEDIA are trademarks, each of which
is held by only one company worldwide. The company owning the trademark PANAVISION found that someone else had registered the domain
name panavision.com, and convinced a United States district court to
order the transfer of the domain name. 9 The same occurred in the case
of ActMedia.1 0 Conversely, other domain names such as perfection.com
and clue.com are identical to words in common use in the English
language.
2. Presence or absence of commercial activity.
Some domain names are used in commercial activity, while others
are not. This is significant because many commonly asserted causes of
action, such as those brought under the Lanham Act 11 or the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act, 12 are expressly directed only to commercial
activity.
3. Presence or absence of allegedly offending conduct above and
beyond mere possession of the domain name itself
As will be discussed in more detail below, in a substantial number of
domain name disputes the plaintiff presents the case as if it were a tradi8. Jonathan Agmon et al., What's in a Name? (visited Feb. 12, 1997) <http'/
www.law.georgetown.edu/Ic/internic/domainl.html>; Carl Oppedahl et al., NSI Flawed Domain Name Policy informationpage (last modified Jan. 24, 1997) <http://www.patents.com/
nsi.sht>; Electronic FrontierFoundation's "InternetAddress & Domain Name Disputes"
Archive (last modified Oct. 2, 1996) <http://www. eff.org/pub/Intellectual-property/In-

ternet..address-disputes/>.
9. See Panavision Intl L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
10. See ActMedia, Inc. v. Active Media Intl Inc., No. 96C3448, 1996 WL 466527, at *1
(N.D. Ill. July 17, 1996).
11. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West Supp. 1996).
12. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c) (West Supp. 1996).

1997]

REMEDIES IN DOMAIN NAME LAWSUITS

tional trademark case with goods or services being marketed in a way
that allegedly gives rise to confusion. Despite the danger of confusion,
however, the reality in these cases is that no goods or services are involved. In such disputes, the complaint, reduced to its essence, is, "We
wish we had registered the domain name first, and we really want to
have the domain name now." In such cases, the past conduct of the defendant domain name owner is generally irrelevant, and in some cases,
there has been no conduct whatsoever other than the mere registration
of a domain name.
4. Presence or absence of a legitimate basis for use of the domain
name.
Some domain names are identical to words or phrases which anyone
could plausibly use. The domain name "homes.com" could be plausibly
used by anyone doing anything involving homes, from real estate brokerage to house construction. The domain name roadrunner.com could
plausibly be used by anyone located in New Mexico, where the state bird
is the roadrunner and dozens of companies are named Roadrunner.13 In
contrast, it is difficult to imagine who, other than the publisher of The
New York Times, could offer an innocent reason to use
newyorktimes.com.
B.

ANALOGIZING

DoMAiN

NAMES

Attempts have been made to analogize domain names to other
things. Some commentators have stated that domain names are of no
greater legal significance than street addresses, urging that since people
do not litigate over street addresses, courts should ignore demands regarding domain names. This analogy fails for the simple reason that one
generally does not choose one's street address, while every domain name
14
is expressly selected by its owner.
The body of cases concerning North American toll-free 800 telephone
numbers is somewhat instructive. The letters on the telephone dial give
rise to easily remembered sequences of digits. The comparison goes only
so far because a telephone customer might obtain a telephone number
without knowing that it "spells" some word or phrase that is important
to someone else. In contrast, a domain name's spelling is evident from
the domain name itself. A party obtaining the telephone number 1-80013. The author was counsel for Roadrunner Computer Systems, Inc. in Roadrunner
Computer Systems, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 96-civ-413-A. (E.D. Va. filed Mar. 26,
1996).

14. This point was, so far as the author is aware, first made clear by Albert Tramposch
of the World Intellectual Property Organization in a posting in a discussion group hosted
by the Internet Ad Hoc Committee.
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698-4637 may truly be unaware that it spells 1-800-NYTIMES, but the
same may not be plausibly said of someone who registers the domain
name nytimes.com.15
In a recent case, Holiday Inns v. 800 Reservation,16 an enterprising
party obtained a telephone number that happened to spell 800HOLIDAY, notable because the second digit after "800" was a zero rather
than the digit "6" corresponding to the letter "O."17 The number 800HOLIDAY was owned by the motel chain Holiday Inns, Inc., the plaintiff
in the action. The practical result was that the defendant party occasionally received calls in which people intended to dial 800-HOLIDAY,
using all letters, but who mistakenly dialed the digit zero instead of a 6,
and offered to book hotel rooms for such people.' 8 The district court
ruled in favor of Holiday Inns, Inc. 19 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit noted
that this party did not overtly trade on the name "Holiday" and took
pains to identify itself when answering the telephone, thus negating any
consumer confusion that might have arisen. The Sixth Circuit felt that
no remedy was needed and reversed, deciding the case against the
20
plaintiff.
A strong analogy can be drawn between domain names and stock
exchange ticker symbols. With ticker symbols, which are by their nature
limited to only a few characters, a company might sometimes find its
desired ticker symbol already taken by someone else. As with domain
names, ticker symbols are allocated in the first instance on a first-come,
first-serve basis. 2 1 In what is perhaps the only published case involving
ticker symbols, MDT v. NY Stock Exchange,22 plaintiff MDT Corp.,
wanted the ticker symbol MDT, only to find that it was already in use by
the company Medtronic, Inc. 23 The court ruled against the plaintiff,
finding no remedy to be necessary. Notably, the ticker symbol had been
in use for some twelve years, a factor the court apparently found relevant
in view of MDT Corp's tardy presentation of a claim to the ticker symbol. 24 Thus, the Holiday Inns and MDT cases suggest that while at15. It should also be understood that in most countries, there are no letters on telephone dials, or the letters are in different places than on North American telephone dials.
Thus, the law relating to disputes over 800 numbers is of only limited utility in an attempt
to provide guidance to courts in such countries.
16. Holiday Inns Inc. v. 800 Reservation Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996).
17. Id. at 620.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 626.
21. See MDT Corp. v. New York Stock Exch. Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1028, 1030-31 (C.D. Cal.
1994).
22. Id. at 1028.
23. Id. at 1031.
24. Id. at 1034.
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tempts to analogize domain names to other property rights may yield
insights, the legal community and the Internet community should be
prepared for the possibility that domain names may turn out to be sui
25
generis.
III.

A. Is

A

ANALYSIS

DoMAIN NAME PROPERTY?

One question that arises, albeit only briefly, is whether a domain
name is property. One factor suggesting that the answer is in the affirm26
ative is that domain names issued by most registration authorities
(Israel being an exception) are capable of being bought and sold.
Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), the registration authority which,
under government contract, will administer corn and other top-level domains until 1998, has taken the position that domain names are property. In an attempt to use federal interpleader 2 7 to escape judicial
review of its actions regarding the domain name clue.corn, NSI stated the
following in its interpleader complaint: "Network Solutions, as an impartial and unbiased stakeholder, has no interest in the property in dispute and is prepared to assign the registration and use of the
'CLUE.COM' domain name as determined by the Court."28 Interpleader
is available only with respect to property, and thus, NSI had to take the
position that the clue.com domain name was property so as to attempt to
avail itself of interpleader. Perhaps the most telling indications that domain names may be property are simply that (1) parties have gone to
court to attempt to obtain them, and (2) courts have been willing to order
transfer of domain names from one party to another.
If one determines that domain names are property, a related question concerns ownership. Does the domain name registration authority
or NSI own the domain names, and a domain name "owner" merely has
25. "Ofits own kind or class; i.e., the only one of its own kind; peculiar." BLAcsS LAW
DICTIONARY

1434 (6th ed. 1990).

26. See Hank Nussbacher, Domain Name assignmentrules in Israel (last modified May
2, 1996) <httpJ/www.isoc.org.il/ildomain.html>.
27. There are two types of federal interpleader, so-called rule interpleader under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 22, and statutory interpleader under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1996).
28. Complaint for Interpleader pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, Network Solutions, Inc.
v. Clue Computing, Inc. et al., No. 96-1530 (D. Colo. filed June 21, 1996). NSI's attempt to
use federal interpleader in this case was ruled improper not because domain names are not
property, but on other grounds. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 946 F.
Supp. 858, 861 (D. Colo. 1996). The court, explaining why interpleader was not proper with
respect to the clue.com domain name, likened NSI to "a wrongdoer with respect to the
subject matter of the suit," said that NSI was not "free from blame in causing the controversy," and said that NSI was improperly seeking "to escape adjudication of its contractual
duties, and possible liability, in [a previously filed] state court action." Id.
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some entitlement to use its domain name, but does not actually "own" it?
Or on the contrary, is the party who has registered and used the domain
name the legal owner of the domain name? Perhaps the question is
merely one of semantics. Perhaps it is irrelevant whether we say that
what people are fighting over is the domain name itself, or as NSI characterized it, "the registration and use of" the domain name. Parties to
domain name lawsuits know perfectly well what they want, and in most
cases they want the domain name. For purposes of this article, we will
defer the question of whether domain names are property, but will simply employ the shorthand that the registrant is the "domain name
owner," and that what is being fought over is "the domain name."
B.

REMEDIES SOUGHT

BY

TRADEMARK OWNERS

Trademark owners have sought a variety of remedies against domain name owners. Most prayers for relief have fallen into two general
categories: cease-and-desist relief and transfer-the-domain-name relief.
A typical prayer for relief in an actual domain name lawsuit reads as
follows:
Wherefore, plaintiff respectfully prays:
1. That defendants, individually and collectively, their agents, servants, employees, representatives, attorneys, related companies,
successors, assigns, and all others in active concert or participation

with defendants or any of them, be preliminarily and then permanently enjoined and restrained:
(a) From using the GLAD trademark, any colorable imitation of the
GLAD trademark, and any thing or mark confusingly similar
thereto or likely to cause dilution of the distinctiveness of the
GLAD trademark or injury to plaintiffs business reputation;
(b) From representing by any means whatsoever, directly or indirectly, that defendants, any products or services offered by defendants including, without limitation, telecommunications
services on the Internet, are associated in any way with plaintiff
or its products or services, and from otherwise taking any other

action likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception on the
part of purchasers or consumers; and
(c) From doing any other acts or things calculated or likely to cause
confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or to lead purchasers or consumers into the belief that defendants' products or
services come from or are the products or services of plaintiff, or

are somehow sponsored or underwritten by, or affiliated with,
plaintiff, and from otherwise unfairly competing with plaintiff or
misappropriating that which rightfully belongs to plaintiff.

2. That defendants, individually and collectively, their agents, servants, employees, representatives, attorneys, related companies,
successors, assigns, and all others in active concert or participation

with defendants or any of them, take affirmative steps to dispel
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such false impressions that heretofore have been created by defendants' use of the GLAD trademark.
3. That defendants be required to relinquish the registration of the
Domain Name "GLAD.COM" and to be limited to use of a Domain
Name or Names that do not use the GLAD trademark, any colorable
imitation of such trademark, or any thing or mark confusingly similar thereto or likely to cause dilution of the distinctiveness of such
trademark or injury to plaintiffs business reputation.
4. That defendants account to plaintiff for defendants' profits arising
from the foregoing acts of dilution, infringement, unfair competition
and misappropriation.
5. That, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117, plaintiff be awarded judgment
for three times the defendants' profits, in accordance with the accounting demanded in the preceding paragraph.
6. That plaintiff have and recover its costs, including its reasonable
attorneys' fees and disbursements in this action, pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 1117.
7. That a declaration and judgment be entered by this Court that defendants' registration, establishment and use of "GLAD.COM" to
identify its Internet Domain is likely to cause confusion with plaintiffs famous registered GLAD mark and that such registration and
use constitute trademark infringement, unfair competition and
trademark dilution by defendants and that Network Solutions, Inc.
be directed to transfer the registration for the "GLAD.COM" Domain Name from defendants to plaintiff.
8. That plaintiff have such other and further relief as the Court may
29
deem just and proper.
The prayer for relief, up to paragraph 8, reads like any boilerplate
trademark prayer for relief, seeking essentially cease-and-desist relief.
Paragraph 8 differs from trademark boilerplate in that it asks that the
court "direct" that the domain name be transferred "from defendants to
plaintiff." This "transfer-of-domain-name" relief is the focus of this
article.
Extremely interesting is how different a domain name suit, such as
that excerpted above, can be from a traditional trademark lawsuit. In a
traditional trademark suit, the defendant has either sold or offered goods
or services, and the sale or offer is alleged to have given rise to infringement. The complaint from which the above excerpt was taken alleged
neither a sale nor offer of goods or services. No commercial activity of
any kind was alleged in the complaint. The only conduct complained of
was the mere registration of the domain name glad.com. Indeed, at the
time the complaint was filed, so far as the author is aware, the owner of
the glad.com domain name had done nothing other than register it.
29. First Brands Properties, Inc. v. Weitzman, No. 96 Civ. 2193 (D. Md. filed July 16,
1996).
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As it happens, the glad.com suit settled, so no judicial factfinding
occurred. However, in light of suggestions made later in this paper, it is
also interesting to note that First Brands was by no means the only company that might have felt it was entitled to the use of the word "glad." In
the United States alone, for example, there are more than two hundred
businesses called "Glad."3 0 Domain names ending in ".com" are worldwide, so one must also look outside the United States for companies that
might feel entitled to the use of the word "glad." Procter & Gamble Limited has a British trademark for "GLAD" for detergents. 3 1 International
Business Machines Corp. has a French trademark "GLAD" for electrical
apparatus. 32 L'Or6al S.A. has a Swiss trademark for "GLAD" for cosmetic products.33 Therefore, any rule of law relating to remedies in domain name cases must necessarily take into account situations in which
there is more than one company using a particular name.
C.

POSSIBLE BASES FOR

DoMAIN

NAME REMEDIES

Every suit filed relating to domain names has based its claims, at
least in part, on trademark law. Thus, it is important to keep clearly in
mind the traditional trademark remedies. When a trademark owner
wins a trademark infringement case, the most commonly granted remedy is an injunction, that is, an order that the infringer must cease and
desist from particular conduct. 34 The simple reason for the injunction is

that if the conduct is causing ongoing harm, no award of money damages
would be adequate to compensate the plaintiff.3 5 In relatively rare cases,
such as those involving counterfeiting, the court also orders impoundment and destruction of the infringing goods. 36 It bears noting that the
trademark owner does not get to keep the infringer's goods, but is merely
entitled to destroy them. 3 7 Finally, awards of money damages are exceedingly rare in trademark cases. One treatise says that "it is a realistic and cautious view" to say that "obtaining a strongly worded
injunction should be viewed as a 'win' in a trademark infringement case
and that recovery of a monetary award of any kind is problematical." 38
30. Dun's Market Identifiers, Dun & Bradstreet, Jan. 1997, availablein DIALOG, File
No. 516.

31. Gr. Brit. Tm. Reg. No. 752245.
32. Fr. Tm. Reg. No. 1536267.
33. Switz. Tm. Reg. No. R 266562.
34. See generally 4 J. THoMS

MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR

COMPETrrION § 30.02 (4th ed. 1996) ("It is difficult to imagine an unfair competition case
where damages are adequate to remedy the problem of defendant's continued acts.").
35. Id.
36. Id. at § 30.16[2][g] and cases cited therein.
37. Id. at § 30.04[5] and cases cited therein.
38. McCARTHY, supra note 34, at § 30.24[2].
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Traditional trademark cases involve sales of allegedly infringing
goods or services. Yet, in many domain-name-related cases, no allegation is made that any goods or services are being sold or offered for sale.
In fact, a substantial number of cases have been brought in which the
only conduct complained of is that the domain name owner registeredthe
domain name and has refused to give it to the plaintiff. Thus, in developing a law of domain name remedies, it is important to distinguish between (1) cases in which conduct above and beyond registration of a
39
domain name somehow forms a partial basis for the trademark claim,
and (2) cases in which the only conduct complained of is that the domain
name owner now owns the domain name.
The closely related, but distinct, legal theory alleged in nearly all
domain name lawsuits is dilution. While many states have had anti-dilution laws for many years, a great shift in American trademark law occurred in January 1996 when Congress enacted the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act. 40 This new law provides an injunctive remedy for any conduct that "dilutes" a trademark, regardless of whether the conduct gives
rise to customer confusion, the only requirements for this relief being
that the trademark is "famous" and that the diluting conduct commenced after the mark became famous. One's first reaction, upon learning of such a law, is to attempt to locate Congress's definition of "famous"
in the Act, since this determines who the eligible plaintiffs are for this
extraordinarily powerful relief. Surprisingly, Congress did not see fit to
define "famous." Instead, Congress merely provided a non-binding list of
eight factors which courts are free to apply or not as they see fit in their
efforts to determine whether a trade mark is "famous."
Senator Patrick Leahy said this about the Act: "[Ilt is my hope that
this antidilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated with
the products and reputations of others."4 1 Given the absence of any definition of "famous," and Senator Leahy's comments, perhaps not surprising to observe is that every subsequent United States lawsuit filed by a
trademark owner relating to a domain name has asserted the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act. Likewise not surprising is that each such lawsuit has been accompanied by a brief quoting the statement by Senator
Leahy.
The trademark plaintiff drafting a domain name complaint need not
hesitate in inserting a dilution claim for the simple reason that there is
no way to rule out the possibility, however remote, that the court might
find the trademark to be "famous." The dilution claim offers the great
39. E.g., conduct that gives rise to customer confusion.
40. 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c) (West Supp. 1996).
41. 141 CONG. REc. S19312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).

448

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XV

advantage that the plaintiff need not prove confusion, as would be required to prove a traditional trademark infringement claim. There is,
however, one salient drawback to a dilution claim for the would-be litigant that desires to possess a domain name, namely that the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act provides an exhaustive list of available remedies, 42 and the transfer of a domain name is not among them. The chief
remedy is a simple injunction 4 3 and, in exceptional cases, an award of
money damages." Thus, for the trademark plaintiff whose goal is to
possess a domain name, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act is (or
should be) of little or no help, other than as a "make-weight" together
with other theories of relief.
D.

REMEDIES GRANTED By NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC.

No discussion of domain name remedies would be complete without
mentioning the peculiar trademark domain name policy of Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI").4 5 Under NSI's policy, 46 a trademark owner can obtain preliminary relief without the burden of showing any likelihood of
success on the merits or any irreparable harm. All the trademark owner
needs to do is write two letters, one to the domain name owner and a
second one to NSI, and NSI will make plans to deactivate the domain
name. Similar relief from an ordinary court would require the abovementioned showings of likelihood of success and irreparable harm, and
would also require the posting of a bond to protect the domain name
owner in the event the relief was improvidently granted.
NSI's policy has come under attack from all sides. The Domain
Name Rights Coalition, which speaks for domain name owners, says
NSI's policy is "unfair," and that it "favors large companies, even when
their claims may be unsustainable." 4 7 A recent article in Wired magazine says, "Network Solutions' policy shows a fundamental misunderstanding of trademark law and offers a novel interpretation of it: the
trademark holder is always right; domain-name holders must prove
42. The Act offers only an "injunction against [the diluter's] commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name. . ." except in cases in which willfulness is shown. 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125 (c)(1) (West Supp. 1996).

43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
44. Id.
45. NSI is the temporary administrator of most Internet domain names, including all
.com domains. NSI is under a five-year contract with the U.S. government that expires in
1998.

46. See David M. Graves, Network Solutions'DomainName Policy (last modified Sept.
9, 1996) <ftpi/rs.internic.net/policy/internic/internic-domain-6.txt>.
47. Domain Name Rights Coalition (visited Feb. 12, 1997) <http://www.domainname.org/intro.html>.
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their innocence. And the only place to do that is in court."48 The Internet subcommittee of the International Trademark Association, which
represents trademark owners, recently issued a paper which "proposes
that the current NSI Dispute Policy be recognized as a failure and
elimi49
nated, [and] that domain name disputes be left to the courts."
For the trademark owner who happens to have a goal of gaining possession of a domain name, the NSI policy is not fully satisfactory for the
simple reason that NSI does not transfer the domain name to the trademark owner. Nonetheless, the NSI policy promotes that goal because in
some cases getting a domain name placed "on hold" under the policy will
cause the domain name owner to be put out of business, which then permits the trademark owner to apply to NSI for the domain name and thus
to obtain it.
A most unfortunate direct effect of the NSI policy has been to make
trademark owners (and perhaps courts) think that somehow the possession of a trademark registration, without more, entitles the trademark
owner to a remedy. Many trademark owners, thus, think of the NSI policy as a perfectly proper weapon to use in cases where an ordinary court
would not rule in their favor.
A recent sequence of events underscores the intellectual poverty of
the NSI policy. In 1989, a company called Publishing Perfection was incorporated and began doing business under that name. 50 In November
1994, the company registered the domain name perfection.com.5 1 The
word "perfection" is, to state the obvious, a common English word, and it
is difficult to imagine circumstances in which one company would have to
answer to another for the use of such a domain name, absent traditional
trademark confusion.
Everything changed in 1995 when NSI began following its now-notorious trademark domain name policy.5 2 Hasbro, Inc., a maker of chil-

dren's games, noted that its "perfection" trademark for children's games
48. Simson Garfinkel, Roadrunner,InterNIC'sAfter You (visited Feb. 12, 1997) <http://
www.wired.com/wired/4. 10/updata.html>.
49. INTA Internet Subcommittee ProposedDomain Name Registry Policy (last modified
Jan. 14, 1997) <http'//plaza.interport.net/inta/intaprop.htm>.
50. Telephone Interview with Richard Wintersberger, President of Publishing Perfection, Inc. (Dec. 1996).
51. Id.
52. NSI Policy, supranote 46, at 9 6(e). Under NSI's policy, NSI does nothing to investigate whether any actual trademark infringement is going on, but at the behest of any
trademark owner, will merely mechanically check to see if the trademark and domain

name are identical, in which case it schedules a cutoff of the domain name at a certain date,
generally 30 days later. In the case of perfection.com, the presentation of two distinct
trademarks (one for children's games, another for cosmetics) led to NSI mechanically making the same check and presumably would have led to NSI's determination that both trademark owners deserved to receive the benefit of NSI's preliminary injunctive relief.
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was text-identical to the domain name owned by Publishing Perfection.
In mid-1996, Hasbro asked NSI to commence a challenge proceeding
against Publishing Perfection.5 3 NSI did so and scheduled a date for the
domain name to be cut off. As it happens, the domain name owner and
Hasbro have agreed to a series of time extensions. 5 4 The domain name
has not yet been cut off, although, at any particular moment there has
always been some date certain in the future at which the domain name
would be cut off.
In late 1996, the L'Oreal cosmetics company noted that its "perfection" trademark for cosmetics was text-identical to the domain name
owned by Publishing Perfection, and in December 1996 asked NSI to
commence a challenge proceeding. 5 5 L'Oreal was apparently unaware
that Hasbro had, just months earlier, made a similar request of NSI.
To the credit of L'Or6al and the domain name owner, they managed
to reach a private resolution that avoided the spectacle of NSI's proceeding with two different challenge proceedings by companies that presumably had comparable claims to the domain name. The sequence of events,
however, illustrates some of the primary flaws in the NSI policy. First,
the NSI policy fails completely to take account of the possibility that two
or more parties may coexist in the use of a trademark. Second, the NSI
policy fails to consider that perhaps no one of them is entitled to take the
domain name from any of the others.
E.

REPORTED CASES IN WHICH DOMAIN NAME TRANSFERS WERE
ORDERED

In traditional goods-and-services trademark cases, the usual remedy, if any, is cease-and-desist relief relating to the disputed goods and
services. But apparently many domain name cases are different from
traditional trademark cases. In three recently reported cases, there
were no goods or services involved, and indeed no conduct other than
registration of the domain name. Yet, the court ordered that the domain
name be transferred from the domain name owner to the trademark
owner.
5
1. ACTMEDIACOM.

6

A company called ActMedia, Inc., which owns a United States trademark registration for ACTMEDIA,5 7 went to Network Solutions, Inc. to
apply for the domain name actmedia.com, and found that a company
Telephone Interview with Richard Wintersberger, supra note 50.
Telephone Interview with Richard Wintersberger, supra note 50.
Telephone Interview with Richard Wintersberger, supra note 50.
ActMedia, 1996 WL 466527, at *1.
57. U.S. Tm. Reg. No. 1,389,370.
53.
54.
55.
56.
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called Active Media International, Inc. had already registered it. 5 s
ActMedia did what many companies do these days when they find that
the desired domain name is already taken-they sued the domain name
owner. In a very short statement of findings that does little to guide
practitioners, the court found the domain name owner's actions to constitute trademark infringement and ordered that the domain name be
given over to the plaintiff.59 The court was silent on the source of its
authority to order that the domain name be transferred.
Not only did the ActMedia opinion omit to mention the basis for its
remedy, the opinion also based its conclusions on a misunderstanding
about how the Internet works. The court said that the "[diefendant's reservation of [actmedia.coml has precluded Plaintiff from reserving an Internet domain name incorporating its registered Mark." 60 In reality, the
plaintiff was not so precluded. First, there are more than 180 top-level
domains in the Internet, of which .com is only one. The trademark owner
could have registered actmedia.orgor a domain name in the. us domain,
either of which would have been "an Internet domain name incorporating its registered Mark."6 1 Second, even within the .com domain it
would have been quite easy for the trademark owner to reserve an Internet domain name incorporating its registered mark, for example
actmediainc.com or actmedia-inc.com. The ActMedia judgment was not
appealed, so one can only speculate as to whether an appellate court
would have attached any significance to this particular
misunderstanding.
Probably what the court meant to say was something rather different, namely that "[diefendant's reservation of [actmedia.com] has precluded [the] plaintiff from reserving" the particular domain name that is
made by adding .com to the company name of ActMedia.6 2 In other
words, probably the court assumed, but did not bother to say openly, that
the only top-level domain suitable for the plaintiffs use was the .com
domain and that the only domain name acceptable to the plaintiff was
the particular .com domain constructed by adding .com to actmedia.
As it happens, actmedia is apparently a unique mark; a search of
online trademark databases for many countries revealed no registrations
owned by anyone other than the plaintiff. That, together with the apparent overlap of lines of business (media presumably overlapping with media), may explain why the court concluded that "[d]efendants'
commercial activities" were likely to cause confusion, and why the court
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

ActMedia, 1996 WL 466527, at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.

452

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XV

found the Illinois Anti-Dilution Act to have been violated.6 3 It may also
explain why the Court apparently felt justified not only in granting the
usual trademark infringement relief enjoining further conduct, but additionally ordering that the actmedia.com domain name be transferred to
64

the plaintiff.

2. INTERMATIC.COM.

65

Intermatic, Inc., the plaintiff, was the owner of a trademark registration for "INTERMATIC"6 6 for a variety of goods relating to its main
line of business: timers that turn electrical equipment on and off at various times of day. 6 7 Intermatic Inc. tried to register the domain name

intermatic.com and found that it had been registered by a Mr. Toeppen. 68 Indeed it found that Toeppen had registered about 240 domain
names, including intermatic.com, deltaairlines.com,britishairways.com,
crateandbarrell.com, ramadainn.com, eddiebauer.com, greatamerica.com, neiman-marcus.com, northwestairlines.com, ussteel.com, and
unionpacific.com.6 9 The trademark owner sued Toeppen, alleging trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and related causes of action. 70
The Intermatic court wrote a thirty-two page opinion which opened
by saying, "Welcome to cyberspace!" 71 One of the problems faced by the
court was the apparent inapplicability of substantive law to the conduct.
Toeppen was not, it seems, engaged in any overt commercial activity
with the contested domain name intermatic.com. Visitors to the intermatic.com Web site were greeted with a decidedly noncommercial
street map of the greater Champaign-Urbana area. 7 2 Yet, the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act explicitly limits itself to commercial activity,
and thus, on its own terms did not provide a remedy to the trademark
owner. 73 The remainder of the Lanham Act likewise limits itself to fact
patterns in which "goods or services" are changing hands "in commerce,"
and Toeppen was apparently intentionally avoiding the provision of
goods or services and anything resembling commerce.
63.
Comp.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

ActMedia, 1996 WL 466527, at *2 (citing the Illinois Anti-Dilution Act, 765 111.
Stat. 1035/15 (West 1996)).
ActMedia, 1996 WL 466527, at *2.
Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1412 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
U.S. Tn. Reg. No. 1,117,588.
Interrnatic,947 F. Supp. at 1229.
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1229.
Id.
Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1232.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(4b) (West Supp. 1996).
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Trademark plaintiffs, when faced with a domain name owner defendant that is not engaged in commerce, have strained to find something to fill the place of the traditional goods and services of a traditional
trademark lawsuit. One approach is to urge (as the Intermatic plaintiff
apparently did) that because the three letters corn are taken from the
word commercial, then the use of a domain name ending in corn is necessarily commercial (and thus counts as commercial activity even in the
absence of any other conduct). Indeed, the designers of the Internet offer
support for this view in the official document RFC 1591, which says in
pertinent part, "This domain [corn] is intended for commercial entities,
that is companies." 74 Yet, the Intermatic court said, instead, "[T]he use
of the first level domain 75
designation '.com' does not in and of itself constitute a commercial use."
In the face of all this, the court in the intermatic.com case might
have chosen to write an opinion stating that registration of an Internet
domain name, without more, can nonetheless count as trademark infringement. If it had done so, this would have been new law and perhaps
bad law. Instead, the court strained to find something commercial in
Toeppen's conduct, and it found two items. First, Toeppen had, for a brief
time, used the mark "INTERMATIC" in connection with the sale of a
computer software program. 76 But this use had ceased prior to the effective date of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, the court noted, and
thus, it was with some apparent relief that the court was able to point to
a second indicium of commercial activity: "At oral argument Toeppen's
counsel candidly conceded that one of Toeppen's intended uses for registering the Intermatic name was to eventually sell it back to Intermatic or
to some other party."77 The court went on to say that "Toeppen's desire
to resell the domain name is sufficient
to meet the 'commercial use' re78
quirement of the Lanham Act."

The Intermatic court, to its credit, did understand domain names
better than the ActMedia court. The plaintiff was "technically capable,"
the court explained, "of establishing its [W]eb page at another domain
name including, for example, intermatic-inc.com and is technically capable of establishing at any available domain name a [Wieb page featuring
the INTERMATIC mark and any other Internet-related marketing or
74. J. Postel, Domain Name System Structure and Delegation, RFC 1591 (Mar. 1994)
<ftp'//rs.internic.net/rfc/rfc1591.txt>.
75. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239.
76. Id. at 1232. The court says nothing that would permit the reader to discern
whether the "software program" was in an area of goods or services likely to be confused
with those of the trademark owner.
77. Id. at 1239.
78. Id.
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business information." 79 Yet, even the Intermatic court seemed to overlook that .com is but one of several top-level domain names in which the
trademark owner might obtain a domain name, stating incorrectly that
"[tihe practical effect of Toeppen's conduct is to enjoin Intermatic from
using its trademark as its domain name on the Internet."8 0 In reality,
Intermatic could have registered intermatic.orgor a domain name in the
".us" domain, either of which would have enabled the trademark owner
81
to "us[e] its trademark as its domain name on the Internet."
HAving found Toeppen's conduct to be "in commerce" 2 and "commercial,"8 3 having found violation of the Illinois anti-dilution law, and
having found that "intermatic" is a unique trademark, the court ordered
that the intermatic.com domain name be given over to the trademark
owner.8 4 The court did not explain how the transfer-of-domain-name relief followed from the Illinois anti-dilution law.
85

3. PANAVISION.COM.

In what is by now a familiar sequence of events, the plaintiff Panavision International L.P. went to register the domain name panavision.com, only to find that it had been previously registered by someone
else.86 Panavision was armed with a registered trademark for PANAVI-

SION8 7 and filed suit, alleging federal and California dilution.8 8
The court found that PANAVISION was "famous" under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act.8 9 In support of this finding, the court noted
that the word "panavision" was not "found in the dictionary" and had
enjoyed a "long period of exclusive use" by the plaintiff.90 Indeed, a
search of online trademark databases for many countries shows no
trademark registrations other than those to the plaintiff. As with
ActMedia and Intermatic, there did not seem to be a plurality of other
companies with comparable claims to the domain name.
The Panavisioncourt, like the Intermatic court, next faced the difficulty that the anti-dilution laws expressly limit themselves to "commercial" activity, and that Toeppen had taken pains not to do anything that
79. Id. at 1232-33.
80. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1233-34.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1239-40. The court apparently felt that from the world-wide nature of the
Internet, it followed automatically that Toeppens's conduct was "in commerce." Id.
83. Id. at 1239.
84. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1241.
85. Panavision Intl L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
86. Id. at 1300.
87. U.S. Tm. Reg. No. 1,160,790.
88. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1300.
89. Id. at 1302-03.

90. Id. at 1303.

1997]

REMEDIES IN DOMAIN NAME LAWSUITS

was commercial in the ordinary sense of the word with the domain name.
The Panavision court openly recognized this problem, noting that
"[riegistration of a trade[mark] as a domain name, without more, is not a
commercial use of the trademark and therefore is not within the prohibitions of the Act."9 1 Like the Intermatic court, the Panavisioncourt supplied the missing commercial activity by construing Mr. Toeppen's
conduct so as to trigger the anti-dilution laws:
Toeppen's "business" is to register trademarks as domain names and
then to sell the domain names to the trademarks' owners. Toeppen's
business is evident from his conduct with regard to Panavision and his
92
conduct in registering the domain names of many other companies.
The court listed some of the "many other companies" and the corresponding domain names registered by Mr. Toeppen: aircanada.com,
anaheimstadium.com, camdenyards.com, lufthansa.com, and yankee93
stadium.com.
Like the ActMedia and Intermatic courts, the Panavision court appeared to misunderstand the Internet. The court stated that "Toeppen
was able.. .to eliminate the capacity of the Panavision marks to identify
and distinguish Panavision's goods and services on the Internet." 94 The
court further found that "Toeppen's conduct. . .prevented Panavision
95
from using its marks in a new and important business medium." Of
course, Panavision could have used its marks in many ways other than
as a domain name, or for example, in the text of a Web site. In this way,
Panavision could quite easily have "identifiied] and distinguish[ed]"
Panavision's goods and services on the Internet."9 6 Panavision could
also have registered panavision.orgor a domain name in the .us domain.
Notwithstanding any factual misunderstandings, having found
"commercial" activity and having found the mark to be "famous," as in
the ActMedia and Intermatic cases, the court unhesitatingly found for
the plaintiff.97 However, as in the ActMedia and Intermatic cases, there
was a difficulty that the court declined to address squarely-the pesky
issue that the dilution law, on its own terms, only permits the court to
award cease-and-desist relief. The court said nothing to explain where a
basis could be found for the extra-statutory relief of an ordered transfer
of a domain name.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1300.
Panavision,945 F. Supp. at 1304.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1306.
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ANALYSIS OF THE REPORTED CASES

The reported cases are extraordinarily fact-specific. Perhaps most
importantly, the Intermatic and Panavisioncases involve judges who disapproved generally of Toeppen's conduct. Each judge felt compelled to
list numerous other domain names held by Toeppen as part of showing a
pattern of behavior. 98
Each case also involved what appeared to be a truly unique mark.
Each of the three marks was coined and none of the three marks can be
found in a dictionary. Furthermore, searches of online databases show
but a single trademark owner for each mark: in each case the plaintiff in
the action. Searches of directories of corporations show few or no other
companies named for the mark.
In contrast, consider other domain name cases in which domain
name owners, in the face of challenges by trademark owners, have been
in and out of court and have retained their domain names. These cases
include roadrunner.corn, 9 9 ty.com,100 clue.corn,10 1 disc.corn,10 2 regis.corn,' 0 3 and juno.com.10 4 The cases have many factors in common.
First, none of the domain names corresponds to a unique mark: roadrunner,clue, disc, regis, and juno are common dictionary words; ty is a
person's name; and dci is an acronym for a three-word company name.
Second, in each case, there are dozens or even hundreds of other companies that use the same name or the same trademark. Thus, the trademark owner presenting the trademark challenge is but one of many
possible claimants to the use of the domain name.
The Panavision court acknowledged that some trademarks are held
by multiple parties: "[Tiraditionally, trademark law has permitted multiple parties to use the same mark for different classes of goods or services." Where a domain name in dispute corresponds to a trademark that
is held by multiple parties, it seems possible that the court would conclude that in the absence of confusion, there is no reason to disturb the
ownership of the domain name.
98. Another reported Toeppen case is American Standard, Inc. v. Toeppen, No. 962147, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14451 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1996). In that case, the domain name
americanstandard.comwas transferred from Mr. Toeppen to the plaintiff. Id. at *2. The

case is of little or no precedential value, however, because it was entered "on consent" of
Mr. Toeppen. Id. at 1.
99. Roadrunner Computer Systems, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 96-civ-413-A.
(E.D. Va. filed Mar. 26, 1996).
100. Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96-20434 (N.D. Cal. filed May 30, 1996).
101. Clue Computing, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96-civ-6945-5 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
fied June 13, 1996).
102. Dynamic Info. Systems Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96-1551 (D. Colo. filed
June 24, 1996).
103. Regis v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96-20551 (N.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1996).
104. Juno Online v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96-1505 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 18, 1996).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A.

DESIGNING A RULE OF LAW FOR

DOMAN NAME

REMEDIES

It will be recalled that this article poses the question:
Under what circumstances ought a court take away a domain name
from one party and give it to another?

Any effort to answer that question must necessarily attempt to harmonize with the already-decided cases, as well as to generate fair and
just results going forward. The following table is offered to categorize
the various types of domain name disputes that have arisen and that are
likely to arise in the future.
Category

Factor I
Is trademark
coined, not
in the dictionary, and
unique?

A.
yes
Panavision

Factor II
Has domain
name owner
registered
numerous
domain
names corresponding
to coined,
unique
trademarks?

Factor III
Is domain
name owner
doing anything at all
with the domain name?

Factor IV
Is domain
name owner
actually
causing confusion with
trademark
owner's
goods or
services?

Factor V
Factor VI
Did tradeProper remmark owner edy?
assert challenge
promptly after domain
name was
registered?

yes

does not
matter

does not
matter

does not
matter

transfer domain name

Intermatic
B.
ActMedia

yes

no

yes

yes

does not
matter

transfer domain name

C.

no

no

yes

no

does not

none

Glad
Perfection
D.

no

no

yes

yes

relevant to cease-andpreliminary desist only
relief and to
liability

E.

no

does not
matter

does not
matter

no

no

matter

B.

none

DISCUSSION OF FACTORS

The factors which courts might take into account in fashioning a
remedy will be discussed in turn.
1. Is the trademark coined, not in the dictionary, and unique?
The relevance of this factor is not directly discussed in the ActMedia,
Intermatic, and Panavision cases, yet given that the remedy given in
those cases is different in kind from any trademark remedy heretofore
granted by a court, the factor is apparently important. Perhaps the underlying policy reason for a forced transfer of the domain name is simply
judicial economy. If realistically only one party could plausibly have use
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of the domain name, then granting only cease-and-desist relief, possibly
followed by registration of the domain name by some third party, would
simply lead to another trademark lawsuit against the new owner of the
domain name. The specter is a never-ending series of lawsuits in which
undeserving parties have to be sued, one by one, to cause a cessation of
infringing use. As will be discussed below, this factor is the sole factor
which, in the authors view, might sometimes justify transfer-the-domain-name relief.
It is important to appreciate that "famous" does not mean "unique."
"Uniqueness" helps a court simply because it has the potential to simplify the question of who might credibly claim the domain name. However, this factor is distinct from the definition, or rather non-definition, of
"famous" in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. With the passage of
years, possibly a court could determine that "Ford" is famous in the area
of automobiles, in the area of fashion models, e.g., "Ford Models," and in
the area of theater, e.g., the Ford Theater in Washington. Yet, even if
there is a finding that "Ford" is famous, this would not and could not lead
to a conclusion that any particular one of the famous mark-holders is
uniquely entitled to own the domain name ford.com.
Instead, for a court to reach a meaningful conclusion that only one
party is entitled to a domain name, the court would necessarily have to
make a fact-finding that exactly one company is so entitled. This finding
would require, at a minimum, a trademark search in each of the generally available on-line trademark databases, 10 5 as well as company-name
searches in a comprehensive selection of on-line company-name
databases. 10 6 In addition, the subject trademark should be searched in
Web search engines. Only if all of these resources come up empty, except
for references to the plaintiff trademark owner, and if the trademark
owner actively affirms that it is unaware of any other possible claimants
to the domain name, should the court consider exercising its equitable
power to order a transfer of the domain name to the plaintiff. Otherwise,
the court should decline to so order.
2. Has the domain name owner registered numerous domain names
correspondingto coined, unique trademarks?
In each of the two Toeppen cases, the court went to some length to
detail the numerous coined and unique trademarks which Toeppen had
105. There are commercial databases providing comprehensive coverage of trademarks
in the United States, in Canada, and in most of Europe, for example the Thomson & Thomson Trademark scan databases.
106. There are commercial databases providing comprehensive coverage of company
names in North America, Europe, Japan, and other areas, published for example by Standard & Poors and Dun & Bradstreet.
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registered as domain names. Recounting such a roster of domain names
is surely emotionally satisfying and may play a meaningful role in inferring the infringement-related state of mind of the domain name owner,
but should play no part whatsoever in selecting the remedy to apply.
The reason is simple: no matter how strongly one disapproves of the domain name owner, such disapproval should not be redirected to the general public, some of whom may have as strong a claim on the domain
name as the plaintiff. The extreme and nearly unprecedented remedy of
an order of transfer of the domain name should be reserved for the few
cases where it is conclusively shown that there is no colorable claimant
to the domain name other than the plaintiff and a roster of other domain
names owned by the defendant does nothing to support such a showing.
3. Is the domain name owner doing anything at all with the domain
name?
In the Toeppen cases much attention was paid to the question
whether the domain name owner was doing anything with the domain
name. The reason for this is simple: the Lanham Act applies expressly
only to commercial activity, and someone who is doing nothing is necessarily not doing anything commercial. However, this factor goes more to
liability than to the selection of remedy.
4. Is the domain name owner actually causing confusion with the
trademark owner's goods or services?
This factor was studiously ignored in the Panavisionand Intermatic
cases, because it would have been difficult or impossible to show such
confusion. The ActMedia case stated in conclusory fashion that confusion was likely, but said nothing to show what basis there was for such a
conclusion. In the case of a non-unique trademark, i.e., a trademark
shared by two or more companies, the transfer-the-domain-name remedy
should be unavailable and the only remaining question would be
whether cease-and-desist relief should be available. The presence or absence of actual or likely confusion is, of course, extremely relevant to the
question of whether there is trademark liability. In the absence of confusion, no trademark remedy at all would be appropriate.
5. Did the trademark owner assert its challenge promptly after the
domain name was registered?
Still another factor that a court might be urged by the parties to
consider is whether the trademark owner presented its challenge
promptly after registration of the domain name or whether the trademark owner allowed months or even years to pass before presenting its
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claim. Many of the highly visible domain name lawsuits 10 7 are ones in
which the triggering event was the act of the trademark owner attempting for the first time to register a domain name to find that the domain
name had been registered by someone else months or years before. In
many of these cases, the suspicion raised in the mind of a skeptical
reader is that the allegation of infringement recited by the trademark
owner is mere bluster and intended to overcome embarrassment at not
having been savvy enough to apply for the domain name earlier. In the
case of a non-unique domain name, such an allegation raised only years
after the domain name owner obtained the domain name tends to ring
hollow, especially when the trademark owner is unable to point to any
particular conduct by the domain name owner that supposedly infringes
other than ownership of the domain name itself.'0 8 The passage of a
long time between registration of a domain name and the challenge by a
trademark owner, especially when combined with a finding that numerous companies use the trademark, i.e., that it is a shared trademark
rather than a coined, unique one, tends to negate a finding of trademark
liability, and thus tends to negate the propriety of granting any remedy
at all.
C.

THE GENERAL FACT-PATERN CATEGORIES

The Intermatic and Panavision cases fall within category A of the
Table.' 0 9 Due to the unique and coined nature of trademarks in this
category, it is suggested that perhaps it is irrelevant whether the trademark owner's assertion of a claim is made promptly after registration of
the domain name. However, for the grant of the hitherto unprecedented
relief of an order transferring the domain name, it is suggested that the
court should require a full and credible showing that there is no one else
entitled to claim the domain name. This article suggests that for the
grant of such sweeping relief, it is not enough that the defendant not
oppose the sweeping relief. After all, the defendant may be aware that it
is going to lose and thus may have little incentive to assist the court in
crafting judicially sound equitable relief. Indeed, in many such cases,
there may be no meaningful commentary from the defendant due to a
failure to appear, or failure to be represented by competent counsel, or to
be represented at all.
Instead, as mentioned above in connection with Factor I of the Ta107. E.g., Roadrunner, supra note 99; Clue Computing supra note 101; Regis, supra
note 103; Dynamic Info. Sys., supra note 102; Panavision,945 F. Supp. 1296; ActMedia,
1996 WL 466527; Intermatic, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14878.
108. Examples of cases which, as perceived by the author, ring hollow in this way are
the glad.com case, the clue.com case, the juno.com case, and the perfection.com case.
109. See supra Part IV. A.
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ble, 1 10 this article suggests that transfer-the-domain-name relief should
be considered by a court sitting in equity only after a thorough and credible showing that there are no other colorable claimants to the domain
name. Stated differently, if a court were to grant such relief in the absence of such a showing, this would merely reward the trademark owner
who happens to win the race to the courthouse. Indeed, the trademark
plaintiff that asks the court to transfer a domain name to it while retaining undisclosed knowledge that other trademark owners have equally
colorable claims to the domain name is coming to the court with unclean
hands, and should not be given equitable relief.
A court sitting in equity, with a trademark claim presented together
with a request that a domain name be transferred, should also bear in
mind that the purpose of the trademark and unfair competition laws is to
protect the public, not merely to protect the particular trademark owner
who happens to stand before the court as plaintiff. This highlights the
fact that parties not before the court, namely members of the public and
other trademark owners, may have colorable claims to the domain name.
Absent an inquiry into this possibility, a transfer of domain name would
be quite likely to harm the parties not represented in the action. Furthermore, the court that orders a transfer without having made such an
inquiry is simply setting the stage for yet another fight over the domain
name, and adding to the workload of the courts.
The ActMedia case does not fit squarely within Category A of the
Table, 1 -1 because little or no factual basis was offered for the remedy
granted. Possibly, given the brevity of the ActMedia opinion, there was
no meaningful opposition by the domain name owner. In such cases, as
mentioned above, encumbent upon the court is to consider not only the
plaintiff but also the public by making due inquiry before granting a
remedy that affects the general public and perhaps other would-be claimants to the domain name.
Where the court discovers, or where the plaintiff discloses to the
court, that there are two or more companies with the same trademark,
equity suggests that before any action is taken by the court tending to
make the domain name available to the plaintiff, reasonable notice ought
to be given to the other colorable claimants to the domain name. Otherwise, the court sitting in equity will again be simply rewarding the first
to reach the courthouse. Of course practices that reward races to the
courthouse tend to engender unnecessary and hasty litigation, as well as
tending to lead to inequitable results for the losers of the race.
Category D of the Table1 12 represents a conventional trademark
110. See supra Part IV. A.
111. See supra Part IV. A.
112. See supra Part IV. A.
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suit, of which there have thus far been no examples.
Categories C and E of the Table 113 are the most interesting, but for
lawyers counseling domain name owners, the most distressing. These
are categories encompassing the increasingly common fact pattern of the
company that attempts to register a domain name, only to find that the
desired domain name was already registered by someone else. Clearly,
given that domain names are registered on a first-come, first-served basis, what the company should have done was to register the domain
name earlier. Notwithstanding, the company covets the domain name
and discovers that it happens to have a trademark registration identical
to the text of the domain name. The company then sues the domain
name owner seeking an order that the domain name be transferred.
This article suggests that such an order should be denied, for several
reasons.
First, to rule otherwise would raise the specter of endless litigations,
as each of the trademark holders takes its turn suing whoever happens
to have the domain name. Stated differently, transfer-the-domain-name
relief is appropriate only if the trademark being asserted is coined and
unique. The vast majority of trademarks are not coined, are not unique,
and are in fact shared by numerous parties who are in different lines of
business. In cases where the trademark is non-unique and where no confusion is present or likely, it is simply indefensible to order a transfer of
the domain name, and indeed is also inappropriate to grant any remedy
at all.
Second, it must be remembered that strictly speaking, there is no
remedy in trademark law or dilution law that calls for transfer of a domain name. The Lanham Act speaks of cease-and-desist relief and relatively rare awards of money damages, but not of transfers of property.
Likewise, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act calls for cease-and-desist
relief and allows damage awards only in exceptional cases.
Third, where the plaintiffs claim is properly understood as nothing
more than "we wish we had registered the domain name earlier and
want the court to force the owner to give it to us," then the delay of
months or years from the registration of the domain name belies any
claim that the domain name, by itself, somehow counts as infringement.
The plaintiff should be denied a remedy and should be encouraged to
select a different domain name. Such cases amount to what has been
called "reverse domain name hijacking," and commentators have suggested that the trademark owner who attempts such reverse hijacking
may run the risk of cancellation of the trademark." 4
113. See supra Part IV. A.
114. Stephen J. Davidson et al., Applying the Trademark Misuse Doctrine to Domain
Name Disputes (visited Feb. 12, 1996) <http.//cla.orgTMMIS/T-MISUSE. htm>.
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Fourth, the Internet generally, and the Web in particular, relies on
stable domain names and URLs. The Web simply would not work if
URLs tended to change from time to time due to court actions brought by
merely covetous plaintiffs. In the case where a domain name owner is
not infringing any trademarks and has selected a name that is nonunique, the court simply should not grant any remedy that disturbs the
stability of the domain name or URL. To do so harms the innocent domain name owner by harming and perhaps destroying the domain name
owner's business, and harms the Internet community generally by rendering unusable their browser bookmarks and hypertext links to the domain name.
Categories C and E of the Table1 15 bring to mind the following passage from Gulliver's Travels:
For example, if my neighbour hath a mind to my cow, he hires a lawyer
to prove that he ought to have my cow from me. I must then hire another to defend my right, it being against all rules of law that any man
should be allowed to speak for himself. Now in this case, I who am the
true owner lie under two great disadvantages. First, my lawyer, being
practiced almost from his cradle in defending falsehood, is quite out of
his element when he would be an advocate for justice, which as an office
unnatural, he always attempts with great awkwardness, if not with ill
will. The second disadvantage is, that my lawyer must proceed with
great caution: or else he will be reprimanded by the judges, and abhorred by his brethren, as one who would lessen the practice of the law.
And therefore I have but two methods to preserve my cow. The first is
to gain over my adversary's lawyer with a double fee, who will then
betray his client by insinuating that he hath justice on his side. The
second way is for my lawyer to make my cause appear as unjust as he
can, by allowing the cow to belong to my adversary; and this if it be
skillfully done will certainly bespeak the favor of the bench... In pleading, [the neighbour's lawyers] studiously avoid entering into the merits
of the cause, but are loud, violent, and tedious in dwelling upon all circumstances which are not to the purpose. For instance, in the case already mentioned: they never desire to know what claim or title my
adversary hath to my cow, but whether the said cow were red or black,
her horns long or short; whether the field I graze her in be round or
square, whether she was milked at home or abroad, what diseases she
is subject to, and the like; after which they consult precedents, adjourn
the cause from time to time, and in ten, twenty, or thirty years come to
116
an issue.

115. See supra Part IV. A.
116.

(1726)

JONATHAN SWIFT,

GULLIVER'S TRAvELs, pt. IV, ch. 5, 236-37 (Bantam Books 1962)
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The courts need to recognize mere covetousness when it is presented
in the guise of a trademark lawsuit. Furthermore, the courts need to be
prepared to deny relief in such cases.
V.

CONCLUSION

Clumsy policymaking by NSI, a poorly drafted Federal Trademark
Dilution Act, and the hard facts presented by the first few domain-nametransfer cases yield an awkward mix of precedents and fact patterns for
domain name-trademark disputes. It is hoped that as courts encounter
new and different fact patterns, the law of domain name trademark remedies will develop in a way that is fair to non-infringing domain name
owners, that promotes stability of URLs and domain names, and that
provides meaningful remedies for owners of the handful of trademarks
that are truly unique.

